INTRODUCTION
The purpose of this research was to sys tematically describe the Medicaid 1915(c) HCBS waivers across the States. States also have the option of offering HCBS via other programs, e.g., the Medicaid Title XIX Personal Care Services (PCS) optional State plan benefit (LeBlanc, Tonner, and Harrington, to be published), the Medicaid Home Health benefit, the Medicaid Early and Periodic Screening, Diagnostic, and Treatment Program (EPSDT), and proThe authors are with the University of California, San Francisco. Government sponsorship of the research upon which this article is based does not constitute endorsement of the results or con clusions presented in this article. This research was supported by the Health Care Financing Administration (HCFA) under Contract Number 500-97-0002. Support was also received from the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research, ED Grant Number H133B980045. The views expressed in this article are those of the authors and do not necessarily reflect the views of the University of California, San Francisco, or the National Institute on Disability and Rehabilitation Research. grams supported with State general funds designed for those who do not qualify for Medicaid, which were excluded from the present study. Emerging publications have addressed issues surrounding the num bers of program participants and related expenditures in the waiver and other HCBS programs, but few have paid close attention to program administration. Therefore, little is known about how the States var y in their development of waivers, selection of target populations, administrative structure, and program poli cies. By "administrative structure," we are referring to ways in which the States have arranged for oversight of a waiver or waivers within an array of agencies, offices, and other organizations. Program policies include those pertaining to eligibil ity, cost caps, service limits, and program monitoring and assessment.
The Medicaid HCBS waiver program was established with the passage of section 2176 of the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act (OBRA) of 1981. Section 2176 created section 1915(c) of the Social Security Act, which authorized States to request the option of providing home and communitybased alternatives to institutional care (Miller, 1992; Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington, 1999) . Many of the first waivers were targeted toward the aged and disabled or those with developmental dis abilities, but in recent years, waivers have evolved to target Medicaid-eligible persons with a variety of conditions and chronic dis orders, such as physical disabilities, acquired immunodeficiency syndrome (AIDS), acquired brain injuries and other forms of severe disability, including, to a limited extent, chronic mental illness (Miller, 1992; Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington, 1999; Harrington et al., 2000a) . The waiver program allows States the opportunity to make available a wide range of non-medical services inherently related to personal assistance, including case man agement, personal care services, homemaker and chore services, adult day care, transportation, and respite and companion services.
Because the 1915(c) waivers were creat ed to offer alternatives to institutionaliza tion, program regulations require HCBS to be offered only to those who are eligible for institutional placement (42 C.F.R. 440.180). Moreover, the States are allowed to target waivers to particular populations. Consequently, unlike optional State plan benefits, they do not require that services be made available to all categorically or medically needy groups. (This is called a waiver of comparability.) Finally, the States also must specify, for each waiver, a limit on the number of individuals who may receive benefits (42 U.S.C. 1396n, section 1915(c) (4)(A)). (These number limits are com monly referred to as "slots.") States have the option of limiting waiver services to tar geted geographic regions as well (42 C.F.R. 441.351, part H), which also distinguishes the waivers from other Medicaid services offered as optional State plan benefits (e.g., Title XIX personal care services) (LeBlanc, Tonner, and Harrington, to be published).
States have the option of setting financial eligibility criteria for the 1915(c) waivers at the same level as those for institutional placement, up to 300 percent of Supplemental Security Income (SSI), although this varies at the States' discretion (Hor vath, 1997; Bruen et al., 1999) . Service-need criteria for the waivers may be no more liberal than need criteria for institutional placement under Federal statute (42 C.F.R. 441.302(c)) but may be more restrictive, at the option of each State. Need criteria for institutional place ment differ from State to State, and conse quently, so do criteria for the waivers (Tonner, Harrington, and LeBlanc, to be published) .
The 1915(c) HCBS waivers are required to be, by statute, cost-neutral. The program was designed to provide a cost-neu tral alternative to institutional care, requir ing the States to keep waiver costs at or below those of comparable institutionbased service.
Shortly after their inception, the HCBS waiver program became a topic of interest among health care and health policy researchers alike (Laudicina and Burwell, 1986; Miller, 1992) . These and more recent studies have begun to describe the breadth and depth of the waivers more fully, typical ly offering statistics on State and national trends (Litvak and Kennedy, 1991; Burwell, 1999; Harrington et al., 2000a; Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington, 1999) , or docu menting the statutes and regulations that shape the benefits . Some have begun to test State-level predictors of waiver participants and expenditures (Harrington et al., 2000c) . Researchers have also conducted indepth studies of select States to test the cost-effec tiveness of the 1915(c) HCBS waivers in comparison to the costs associated with institutional care, producing mixed results (Vertrees, Manton, and Adler, 1989; Alecxih et al., 1996) .
With some foundation of an understand ing for the statistical trends on 1915(c) HCBS waiver participants and expendi tures, analysts are beginning to look beyond the numbers, toward an array of issues concerning waiver policy and ser vice outcomes. The administrative struc tures that underlie this joint Federal-State benefit program have received relatively little attention to date. Some have focused on specific services such as personal care (LeBlanc, Tonner, and Harrington, to be published) and case management (Gilson and Casebolt, 1997; Micco et al., 1995) , as well as the potential benefits of consumerdirected models of care (Beatty et al., 1998; Benjamin, 1998; Dautel and Frieden, 1999; Doty, Kasper, and Litvak, 1996; Scala, Mayberry, and Kunkel, 1996) , while others have examined issues related to specific populations targeted for waiver services (e.g., Anderson and Mitchell, 1997; Buchanan and Chakravorty, 1997; Degenholtz, Kane, and Kivnick, 1997; West et al., 1999) . The present research focuses more explicitly on some of the ways in which the 1915(c) waivers are administered and regulated by the States.
METHODS
Data were predominantly collected from telephone interviews with State officials who work closely with the 1915(c) waiver programs. Initial telephone calls to each State's office of Medicaid were made to identify the appropriate persons to be interviewed. It was our goal to locate individuals who worked somewhere between the front lines of service delivery and the upper lev els of policy planning. Most of those interviewed held jobs with titles including terms such as specialist, analyst, manager, admin istrator, supervisor, or coordinator. A small number worked as departmental or program directors. In States with many waivers, a person knowledgeable about the waiver program as a whole was interviewed. In such instances, followup with additional contacts for specific details about particular waivers was also carried out.
All interviews were conducted between fall 1998 and summer 1999. Data were collected from officials in all 50 States and Washington, DC. Interviews lasted, on average, 42 minutes. In five States, in-person interviews were carried out as part of site visits for a related study.
The structured inter view protocols included a series of questions regarding the agencies that administered the waivers, the eligibility criteria used for the waivers, and the types of formal limits placed on waivers in terms of costs and hourly limits. The survey also asked about the case management services provided and programs for monitoring client satis faction and quality.
Medicaid financial eligibility data collect ed via the surveys were compared with two recent reports (Hor vath, 1997; Social Security Administration, 1999) Table 1 shows a ranking of the States with regard to the size of their waiver programs, including the total number of waiver participants, nursing home or ICF-MR Most States adopted the Medicaid spe cial income rules for institutional place ment, allowing up to 300 percent of SSI for the categorically needy. Fourteen States had Medicaid eligibility income standards below 300 percent of SSI for the categori cally needy. States may also have different special income rules for those that are medically needy than for those that are cat egorically needy under the Federal rules. States also have spousal impoverishment rules that allow for the separation of assets for those in institutions.
RESULTS

Size and Administrative Structure
Comparing special income rules for waiver eligibility, 44 States had income rules for the HCBS waivers that were the same as those for institutional placement in 1998-1999. In the remaining seven States (with the exception of Arizona, which oper ates an 1115 waiver), waiver eligibility was tied to a lower income standard for at least some waivers (Alabama, Connecticut, Idaho, Maryland, Mississippi, Utah, and Washington, DC). In these States, it was consequently more difficult for applicants to qualify for waiver services than for insti tutional care.
Finally, 12 States had at least one HCBS waiver that was not statewide in scope. In addition, an unknown number of waivers intended to be statewide are in reality limited to select geographic regions, partially due in some States to a shortage of available providers (Harrington, LeBlanc, and Tonner, 1999 ; LeBlanc, Tonner, and Harrington, to be published). Therefore, the degree to which statewide coverage is actually achieved for many waivers remains unclear. Table 2 contains data on cost caps (ceil ings) and formal limits on ser vices imposed in the waivers. All 1915(c) waivers are required by Federal statute to be cost-neutral and, as a result, all States reported using cost caps as a means of controlling program expenditures.
Cost Caps and Formal Limits on Ser vice
The form of these caps, however, dif fered across the States. Fifteen States used the aggregate-level cost controls for each active waiver and thus did not enforce indi vidual cost caps on participants. With aggregate cost caps, some program partic ipants receiving waiver ser vices could exceed the costs of comparable institution al care. However, all State officials stated that their waivers remained cost-neutral despite these exceptional cases. Some States used less than 100 percent of total institutional costs for the aggregate cost cap; for example, Illinois used a cap of 80 percent of the average nursing home rate.
Another cost-containment strategy was the use of cost caps applied at the individ ual level. Seven States enforced cost limits for individual participants. In the remain ing 28 States, a combination of aggregate and individual cost caps was used, varying waiver to waiver (Table 2 ). To illustrate, New Jersey adopted aggregate cost caps in (Table 2) . More than one-half of the States (31) had no formal ser vice limits, however, 19 enforced limits on at least some services or in at least one waiver (Table 2 ). In Georgia, for example, there was the stipu lation in the MR/DD waiver that the State would not pay for more than 6 hours per day of day habilitation service. Kansas had stricter service limits (12 hours per day) in the frail elderly waiver than in its other waivers. In Oklahoma's MR/DD waiver, there were time limits on each waiver ser vice, but in its aged and disabled waiver, the use of individual cost caps sufficed to limit service use. In Minnesota, there were not only formal limits on the use of select services but also on various combi nations of services. Similarly, in Rhode Island, which had only one formal service limitation, there was a 30-hour limit on homemaker and personal care services combined per week in the elderly waiver. Moreover, formal service limits might be expressed in different metrics. In Kentucky, individual waiver services were limited either in units (i.e., hours or other time increments) or in dollars (creating a different type of cost cap). Table 3 presents data regarding the use of case management in the Medicaid 1915(c) waiver program. Case management, or care coordination in some form, was generally an available service in the HCBS waiver program, offered in all but 10 States as a specif ic waiver service, excluding Arizona and Washington, DC, which did not have 1915(c) waivers in 1997-1998. Table 3 shows that case management by means of the waivers represented an average expenditure of $1.67 per capita in 1997. This average was 4.6 percent of total HCBS waiver services in l997.
Program Implementation and Monitoring
Many States offered case management services through a State plan optional ben efit (i.e., "targeted case management"). Statute defines targeted case management services as "services which assist an indi vidual eligible under the plan in gaining access to needed medical, social, educa tional and other ser vices." (42 U.S.C. 1396n (g)(1)). States are allowed to reach out beyond the bounds of the Medicaid program to coordinate a broad range of activities and services necessary to the optional functioning of a Medicaid client (Health Care Financing Administration, 2000) . These data do not allow one to dis cern the ways in which targeted case man agement may or may not differ from case management offered via other funding streams.
The average per capita expenditures for targeted case management services was $5.39 per capita in 1997. All except six States provided targeted case management services, but detailed data regarding who received those services were unavailable. There was variation, unmeasured in these data, across States as well as between waivers within States, in the use of these two types of case management services for Medicaid participants. Moreover, data regarding the degree to which States financed case management as a compo nent of Medicaid administrative expenses were also unavailable. The lack of com plete data on the full range of case man agement options exercised by the States suggests that the statistics presented in Table 3 States, as noted in Table 3 , waiver partici pants were allowed the option of refusing case management oversight. Table 3 also compares the States in terms of their overall expenditures on case management for their Medicaid programs. Total case management expenditures per capita include expenditures in the 1915(c) waivers and those for targeted case man agement in the optional State plan. Eleven States spent more than $10 per capita on case management in these two Medicaid programs combined; the average was $6.70 per capita. This was 23 percent of the total 1915(c) waiver expenditures in l997. In Tennessee and Mississippi, case manage ment expenditures were larger than overall waiver expenditures. In others, case man agement expenditures amounted to more than one-half as much as was spent on the waivers in total (Massachusetts, South Carolina, Michigan, Georgia, and Idaho).
Formal Client Satisfaction and Quality Assessment
Two ways of monitoring waiver services are the development of tools for assessing client satisfaction and the creation of orga nizational structures devoted to the assess ment of service quality. Officials from 67 percent of the States described some type of client satisfaction survey (not shown). Surveys were typically conducted by tele phone or mail and occasionally in person or some combination thereof. Seventyeight percent of the States incorporated some type of formal quality assessment into their program management. In response to questions about monitoring service quality, many officials reported that quality assessment was part of the case managers' ongoing responsibilities.
Existing client satisfaction and quality assessment efforts tended to be limited to specific waivers or administering agencies, varying across them, and only sporadically implemented on relatively small numbers of program participants. In Iowa, for instance, for the TBI and MR waivers, extensive outcome-based surveys were carried out, which involved face-to-face interviews with a random sample of clients conducted by a survey team. In 1998-1999, these efforts were part of a pilot project funded by the Robert Wood Johnson Foundation. In con trast, for Iowa's AIDS waiver, assessment activities were limited to a paper review of care plans followed up with random tele phone calls to selected clients. Officials in Iowa planned to extend outcome-based sur veys to all waivers in the future.
It was also not uncommon for monitor ing efforts to be left to provider agencies, instead of carried out directly by the administering government agency. For example, in Georgia, the Division of Aging required that all direct service agencies used in its elderly and disabled waiver program evaluate participant satisfaction and ser vice quality on an annual basis. Although the Division of Aging monitored this process, the agencies were left to their own devices in designing such assess ments. These data do not allow us to dis cern the relative costs and benefits of such arrangements for evaluating waiver ser vices nationwide.
Finally, State officials had difficulty spec ifying the degree to which they formally assessed client satisfaction or service qual ity. Some reported these activities were components of case management. For the purposes of this research, States without clearly defined mechanisms extending beyond case management were not count ed as initiating formalized and targeted sat isfaction or quality assessment. In this respect, we underestimate their occur rence. However, because we credited all States that operated some targeted assess ment mechanism, regardless of its scope, breadth, or administering agency, we simultaneously overestimate the occur rence of these activities.
DISCUSSION
In 1998-1999, there were active Medicaid 1915(c) HCBS waivers in 49 States and Washington, DC, ser ving more than 500,000 persons. The waiver program nationwide has grown steadily since its inception (Harrington et al., 2000a) . Despite being widespread, however, the program remained small in relation to those offering institutional placement. Medicaid 1915(c) waiver participants were 32 percent of the Medicaid participants in institutional care in 1997. In addition, HCFA Form 64 data on Medicaid expendi tures show that HCBS, of which the waivers are one program, collectively rep resent a small proportion of spending on nursing home and ICF-MR care (Burwell, 1999) . Some portion of this difference in program expenditures is attributable to the fact that Medicaid institutional costs include expenses associated with the provision of room and board, whereas Medicaid HCBS regulations prohibit room and board payments. Nonetheless, such variation in both participants and expendi tures is clearly cause for more targeted studies of costs across the various longterm care (LTC) benefits, as well as for examinations of current spending levels and their consequences.
Although researchers have invested considerable effort studying how many participants receive waiver services and at what costs (Burwell, 1999; Harrington et al., 2000a; Miller, Ramsland, and Harrington, 1999) , little has been written concerning the programmatic and admin istrative structures that support this com plex Federal-State benefit program. These data demonstrated that waiver administra tion is dispersed across a number of gov ernment agencies and divisions within States. The existing network of waiver programs and administering agencies observ able in many States appeared to be primar ily shaped by each State's organizational structure for health and human services as well as on where program expertise is available.
Perhaps most important was the fact that waivers were targeted toward groups of individuals categorized on the basis of characteristics that distinguish them (e.g., diagnostic labels), rather than on needs they share with others requiring LTC. Most States had multiple agencies admin istering waiver services to multiple target groups. It was not clear what the relative costs or benefits are of duplicating process es across agencies or departments versus creating a single point of administrative activity. There was already some evidence to suggest States are moving toward the latter. Oregon, for instance, reported streamlining the administration of its HCBS waiver programs into two agencies. Initiatives to encourage waiver consolida tion may be welcomed by additional States (e.g., New York, Texas, and Wisconsin), while other States may prefer the current structure. In addition, some States are considering the placement of Medicaid HCBS under managed care (e.g., Delaware, Georgia, Hawaii, Kentucky, Nebraska, Oklahoma, and Wisconsin) (Harrington et al., 2000d) . As these admin istrative changes evolve across the coun try, additional study will be needed to track and assess their impact on administrative efficiency, costs, and client outcomes.
These data also showed that, despite their ultimate authority over the 1915(c) HCBS waiver program, State Medicaid offices were structurally removed from the day-to-day work involved in implementing many waivers. Only 64 of the 234 active waivers (27 percent) in 1998-1999 were administered directly by a State office of Medicaid. This finding raises concerns because it suggests that the State officials ultimately responsible for the fate of these programs are often isolated from the front lines of care. Recent indepth studies of selected State 1915(c) waiver programs found that much of the initiative, innova tion, and leadership concerning HCBS waivers resided outside of Medicaid. Moreover, there was site-visit evidence to suggest that some State Medicaid offices act primarily to control costs (Harrington, LeBlanc, and Tonner, 1999) . Further study is required to assess the generalizability of these findings.
Further research is needed to learn more about the role of State Medicaid offices in the development and mainte nance of the 1915(c) waivers program. Little is known about the day-to-day rela tionships between various State offices and related agencies in managing their LTC programs. Perhaps even less is known about the historical, political, and social contexts of these relationships (Harrington et al., 2000e, 2000f, 2000g; Newcomer et al., 2000a Newcomer et al., , 2000b . Once analysts are able to more fully describe these administrative arrangements across States and the power ful social forces that shape them, they should also strive to develop methods for linking them to the size, scope, and quality of HCBS programs such as the 1915(c) waivers.
These data also offer clear illustration of how a few States limit financial eligibility for Medicaid waiver services. State finan cial eligibility for HCBS services was gen erally the same as the eligibility for individ uals living in nursing facilities or ICFs-MR. However, financial eligibility criteria for waiver benefits in seven States were more restrictive than those for institutional placement, creating an explicit bias away from HCBS. These States also set differ ent financial eligibility criteria for different waivers, creating inequities across groups targeted for waiver services. The effects of these financial eligibility rules on program participants and on those consequently denied service have not been studied, highlighting a gap in HCBS research.
One policy option would be for Federal policymakers to consider a statutor y change requiring the States to use the same financial eligibility criteria for institu tional care and HCBS. Although this approach would increase costs in some States, it would reduce the inherent institu tional bias. Alternatively, Congress might consider financial initiatives that encour age the States to use the 300 percent of SSI maximum income level for Medicaid 1915(c) waiver eligibility for both categori cally and medically needy individuals.
We also found that, once participants were enrolled in the program, States imposed limitations on service use, sometimes by setting formal limits, but more uniformly by imposing cost caps. Fifteen States have enforced cost limits only in the aggregate and have still demonstrated cost-neutrality. This approach appeared to be more liberal and generous than the use of individual cost caps used in other States, however, this may not be the case, as at least some States use only a percentage of comparable institutional costs in setting aggregate cost caps (complete data unavailable). In addition to enforcing cost limits on individual participants, some States enacted extra cost controls by for malizing specific limits on given waivers or specific waiver services. By using differ ent cost controls for different waiver target groups, the States may contribute to large differences in spending across populations (Harrington et al., 2000a) . Although dif ferent groups may have different needs and expenses, the consequences of such differential spending remain to be system atically studied. Moreover, given the fun damental cost-containment mechanisms built into waiver policy, it is unclear whether additional limits in State policies are of practical use. Unfortunately, such variations in waiver policy are difficult to study because they are used contempora neously with other administrative arrange ments.
Case management was provided in all States (no data presented for Arizona and Washington, DC, which did not have waivers in l997-1998) either in the 1915(c) waiver or through the targeted case man agement program. The available data did not allow for a complete description of the substance and influence of case manage ment across waivers. Nonetheless, accord ing to the conservative estimates drawn from these data, Medicaid-funded case management expenditures in the waiver program and targeted case management expenditures were equal to 22.4 percent of the total 1915(c) waiver program expendi tures. It is not clear whether case manage ment services were cost-effective for waiv er recipients. Especially when viewed in light of the States' demonstrated efforts to contain costs, numerous questions regard ing the multifaceted role of case managers in the 1915(c) waivers program should be addressed by future research: What is the role of the HCBS case manager? To what extent are they simply gatekeepers to ser vices? Under what circumstances are they useful to clients across waiver populations? With the rapid growth of consumer-direct ed models of care, these issues await addi tional study.
These data also showed that formal, tar geted assessments of client satisfaction and service quality were not uniformly con ducted with regard to waiver services. According to numerous State officials, these activities were generally considered to be part of the case manager's role, however, it was unknown whether their work entailed systematic, meaningful, and indepth assessments of client satisfaction and care quality. Further study is required to examine the role of case management in the conduct of such assessments. Is there an inherent conflict between these tasks and the role of gatekeeper to service? Federal and State policymakers should begin evaluating ways to assess client sat isfaction and service quality beyond the basic oversight of care coordination and case management.
Nearly two decades after their inception, Medicaid 1915(c) waivers account for the largest proportion of formal LTC in the home and community for low-income Americans (Burwell, 1999) . As a benefit program, the waivers have, in a sense, come of age. With their widespread imple mentation, appeal among the general pub lic, and recent advances of the disability rights movement (e.g., U.S. Supreme Court decision in Olmstead v. L.C., 119 S. Ct. 2176 Ct. (1999 ), the time appears ripe for rapid expansion. However, in response to Federal 1915(c) waiver statutes and regu lations that (1) target special populations and geographical areas; (2) allow States to use more restrictive financial eligibility cri teria for the waivers than for institutional care; and (3) require cost-neutrality, the States have created program structures that inherently limit growth, such as cost ceilings and hourly limits on services. If the HCBS programs are to be expanded, as is the stated goal of HCFA, then structural and policy barriers that may limit the program require a careful examination.
